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Turbofan engines are huge vacuum cleaners - birds are sucked in 
from everywhere 
A MISCONCEPTION 
REALITY 
They are only ingested if they are in line with engine 
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• Certification regulations for bird ingestion are 
designed to achieve required safety goals 
 
• Manufacturers design engines to meet the 
rules with safety margins 
 
• The technology and rules have been evolving, 
it is a learning process 
HOW FLEET SAFETY IS ASSURED 
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RULE CHANGES WITH TIME 
1. 1965 FAR 33.13/19 , details in AC 33-1 
2. 1968 AC33-1A 
3. 1970 AC33-1B 
4. 1974 FAR 33.77 (in amdt 6) 
5. 1984 FAR 33.77 (amdt 10) 
6. 2000 FAR33.76 (amdt20) becoming effective ~1994 
7. 2007 FAR33.76 (amdt 243 becoming effective 
~2001 
8. 201?  Hudson accident, Bird III committee 
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BIRD RULES ARE BASED ON WEIGHT 
CLASSES 
 Small (flocking)  <4ozs 
 Medium (flocking)  >0.75 – 
2.5lbs 
 Large Flocking  >2.5 – 8lbs 
 Large (single)  >4lbs 
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1960‟S - 1974 
FAR 33.13/19 , details in AC 33-1, -1A, -1B 
Foreign Object Ingestion (ice, birds, tire, gravel etc.) 
  small birds (2-4ozs) 
  medium birds (1-2lbs) 
  large birds (4lbs) 
 
Takeoff power and initial climb speed 
Medium/Small run-on at least 5 minutes at desired minimum 
75% thrust with no indications of imminent shutdown 
4lb large bird, safe shutdown 
The run-on capability is “advisory” 
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1974 – 1990 
FAR 33.77 (amdt 6) 
Established bird requirements in FOD rule and adopted details 
similar to AC 33-1B 
 1.5lb medium birds, up to maximum of 8 birds 
  5 minute run-on, 75% thrust 
 
1984 FAR 33.77 (amdt 10)  
 Medium (and small) birds aimed at critical areas 
 
 
Significant change, thrust & run-on MUST be 
demonstrated 
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1990‟s 
In the mid-80‟s,  industry & regulators recognized that 1.5lbs 
was not enough, we were meeting flocks of large gulls, the “Bird 
Committee” was formed and created a separate bird rule 
• FAR33.76 (amdt20) 
• Substantial rewrite of requirements 
• Medium birds increased to 2.5lbs for mid- & large-sized 
engines 
• Mix of 1.5 & 2.5lb, up to 5+6 dependent on engine size 
• Ingest at critical conditions 
• 75% thrust capability 
• 20 minutes run-on with throttle excursions to simulate 
go-around and baulked landing. 
• Law in 2000 but becoming effective mid-90‟s 
• Large single bird 4/6/8lbs safe shutdown 
Another significant increase in requirements 
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2000 - 2008 
1990‟s - Elmendorf accident, goose populations on the rise 
 
• Bird II formed, 2000-2002 added Large Flocking Bird 
Rule for larger engines 
– 4.1 to 5.5lbs demonstration at takeoff power 
– 50% thrust capability 
– 20 minutes run-on with throttle excursions to 
simulate go-around 
– Law in 2007 but becoming effective ~2001 
 
A further significant increase in requirements 
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• Aircraft ingested geese into both engines during early 
climb 
• Lost virtually all thrust, landed in the river 
• AIA working group (industry & regulatory agencies) has 
been reviewing last decade of bird ingestion data to 
assess the effectiveness of current rules, and whether 
revised rules need to be promulgated  
2009 THE HUDSON EVENT 
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THE ENGINE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
CONTINUED THRUST HAVE INCREASED 
SIGNIFICANTLY 
20 minute run-on at 
>50% thrust 
20 minute run-on at >75% thrust 
5 minute run-on at >75% thrust 
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HAVE WE CHANGED ENGINE CAPABILITY? 
• YES 
 
• Each working group database reflects later engine 
standards 
 
• Power loss rates improved 
– FAA report showed IFSD‟s down 75% with FAR33.77 
 
• 33.76 (2.5lb birds) showing further improvements 
– But still fewer than half of flights in latest database 
 
• LFB rule currently has relatively little experience 
– Just a few engines certified to that standard 
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SEVERE FAN BLADE DAMAGE RATES 
DECREASING WITH EACH ENGINE GENERATION 
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Fan blade fracture rate by Generation 
Fwd Uncontained Fan Blades 
Blade transverse fractures 
14  
EFFECT OF ENGINE CHANGES ON FLEET 
PERFORMANCE TAKES TIME 
• Aircraft/engines have useful lives of 20-30 years 
• Bird ingestion is a learning process 
• Changes are evolutionary 
• Long design cycle, even longer service lives 
• Hudson engines were designed over 20 years ago, they 
are still in production 
• Ingestion database composition has changed, but is still 
not a majority of “2.5lb” engines 
• 1969-1999 data approximately two-thirds AC33 
certified, the remainder nearly all FAR33.77 
• 2000-2008 still much less than half FAR33.76 
 
It can take more than a decade for new, more capable 
designs to become majority of fleet 
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BIRD COMMITTEES / WORKING GROUPS 
• Industry works with the regulatory agencies to review 
service experience with bird ingestions, pool data 
together into database 
• Current WG data 2000 thru 1Q 2009 
• Follows on from LFB data collected 1995-1999 
• Data EIS-95 from earlier committee included 
• Includes FAA wildlife database 
• Includes EASA/CAA database 
• Review adequacy of rules to meet hazard 
• Focus is on safety, not cost 
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DATABASE COMPARISON 
1970-1999 
 
• 265x106 flights 
 
• 16,000 engine events 
• ~98% <2.5lbs 
 
2000-2008 
 
• 289x106 flights 
 
• 11,300 engine events 
• ~97% <2.5lbs 
• ~95% <2.5lbs with „generics‟  
(bird weight class estimated 
from engine damage) 
 
• There is no statistical difference between LFB rates in 
databases 
• SEI (single-engine ingestion) of 2.5-8lb approximately           
1 per 400,000 flights 
• MEI (multi-engine ingestion) closer to 1 per 8 million 
flights 
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ALTITUDES/SPECIES 
Altitudes (AGL)  
 86% 0-200ft 
 9% 200-1000 
 4% 1000-5000 
 1% >5000 
 
Bird Species 
 
• Approximately 20% of ingestions are identified, 
the remainder will be almost all small/medium 
birds 
 
• Gulls are still the highest proportion of identified 
species (approximately 30%) 
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INGESTION RATE REDUCES WITH ENGINE SIZE 
• Mid-sized engines do ingest 2.5-8lb birds at less than 
half the rate of large engines 
– Large engines have a much greater inlet area, so more 
probable for birds to be in their path 
– Avoidance by bird - easier to dodge a 6ft engine than 10ft? 
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YEARLY MEI‟S OF 4-8LB BIRDS 
ARE RELATIVELY CONSTANT  
• 4-8lb SEI per flight rose through 90‟s 
• recent trend is flattening 
 
• Multi-engine ingestions remained flat at 0 to 3 
events each year 
 
Control measures are working, encounters near 
airports are smaller flocks 
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ARE MAJOR GOOSE POPULATIONS 
STABILIZING? 
• N. American Canada & Snow Goose 
population growth appears to have slowed 
• N. America something changed late 90‟s 
• Population control? 
• Carrying capacity? 
• U.K. in 2005 similar 
http://www.bto.org/birdtrends2010/wcrcango.shtml 
Canada Geese Snow Geese 
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WHAT CAN WE DO NEXT? 
• Engines 
• The rules will change again 
 
• Engines designs have been continually 
improving 
• Technology has limits 
• We need a multi-discipline approach to 
address the hazard 
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WHAT CAN WE DO NEXT? 
• Continue to control the hazard at airports 
• It is effective 
• A trash transfer station 2,000 ft from LGA?? 
• Seemed crazy, but excellent study done 
• Warn the crew 
• Avian radar at airports is essential 
• BASH is a good model (AHAS/NEXRAD) 
• Deter from path 
• What do birds perceive as a threat? 
• They don‟t move out of the way of cars 
• Avoid 
• Only seconds for crew to react @ 200-250 mph 
• They need technology – radar? 
23  
SUMMARY 
• The hazard does not appear to be growing as it was 
through the 90‟s 
• Field experience is constantly monitored, and we 
continue to learn and improve 
• Later generation engines are showing significantly 
better capability than early designs due to new 
technology and rule changes 
• The commercial fleet has an excellent safety record 
and will continue to become even safer as we 
continue efforts to reduce the probability of ingestion 
and newer engines move into the fleet 
